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Private Party Recovery of Environmental
Response Costs
James R. Haisley·
I.

INTRODUCTION

Owners of sites contaminated by hazardous waste,
neighbors of such sites, and other private parties may be faced
with enormous costs associated with environmental cleanups,
regardless of whether they had any direct involvement in the
waste disposal activities. Increasingly, parties that are not
responsible for these environmental harms, or, only partially at
fault, are seeking to recover the costs of environmental cleanup
from other responsible parties.
An action to recover environmental response costs may
arise under various situations. Private parties may find
themselves liable for cleaning up hazardous waste pursuant to
a government order, or may choose to cleanup contaminated
property voluntarily because such contamination is inconsistent
with present uses of the property. Property owners may also
seek to recover the costs associated with cleaning up a release
or threatened release from adjacent land which threatens to
contaminate their nearby property. Because the presence of
hazardous waste is often difficult to detect, purchasers, lenders,
and other parties to real estate transactions may also find
themselves facing enormous liability and look for others to
share in the cleanup costs.
Private recovery of such response costs may be available
under federal and state statutes, as well as common law
theories of nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability.
Recovery may also be available under certain insurance
policies. The purpose of this article is to provide a brief
*
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overview of the various statutory and common law theories
authorizing private recovery, the scope of available relief, and
potential defenses.
II.

STATUTORY SOURCES FOR RECOVERY OF RESPONSE COSTS

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980

A.

By far, the most comprehensive and widely used statutory
mechanism for private recovery of environmental response
costs arises under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 1
Section 107 of CERCLA specifically provides that any person
who can demonstrate that the release of a hazardous substance2 has caused it to incur response costs, may recover
those necessary response costs from other parties whom the
statute holds liable. 3 Response costs are broadly defined to
include removal and remedial action, and enforcement activities related thereto. 4

1. Potentially Liable Parties
Section 107 of CERCLA permits any person who has incurred response costs as a result of a release of hazardous
substances to recover those costs from four classes of potentially responsible parties (PRPs). These "responsible parties"
include: (1) Current owners and/or operators of facilities at
which a hazardous substance release is occurring or is threatened; (2) persons who owned and/or operated a facility at the
time of disposal of any hazardous substance;5 (3) persons who
1.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1989) (all subsequent citations to 42 U.S.C. refer to
1989).
2.
"Hazardous substances" are defined by CERCLA to include most RCRA
hazardous waste and other hazardous or toxic substances identified or listed under
CERCLA, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and other identified federal
statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
3.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1-4).
4.
42 u.s.c. § 9601(25).
5.
"Owner or Operator" is defined by CERCLA to include persons owning or
operating a facility, and transporters of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. §
9601(20). This defmition specifically excludes persons who hold an indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security interest, but have no participation in the
management of a facility. However, a lender or other secured party which has even
minimal involvement in management of a facility may be liable as an owner. See
Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir.
1988); U.S. v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
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arranged for the disposal, treatment, or transportation of any
hazardous substance to a disposal or treatment facility; and (4)
persons who accept or accepted any hazardous substance for
transportation to a disposal or treatment facility. 6 Courts
which have attempted to interpret this provision of CERCLA
have determined that lessors; 7 corporate officers, directors and
employees;8 parent corporations;9 successor corporations;10
and secured creditors which have participated in the day-to-day
operational management of a site or facility may also be potentially responsible parties. 11
2. Prima Facie Case
The necessary elements for establishing liability in a private party cost recovery action have been defined by several
court decisions. 12 To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff
must prove that: (1) The defendant is an "owner or operator" or
otherwise falls within one of the four categories of covered
persons listed in section 107(a); (2) the defendant caused a
"release" 13 or threatened release of a hazardous substance into
the environment; (3) the release or threatened release occurred
at a "facility";14 ( 4) the release or threatened release has
6.
42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1-4).
7.
See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044-45 (2nd Cir.
1985); U.S. v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 747-48 (W.D. Mich.
1987), affd sub nom., U.S. v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990).
8.
U.S. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 74344 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
at 1052-53; Kelley v. ARCO Industr. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (W.D. Mich.
1989); Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 831-832 (D. Vt. 1988), vacated in
part, 1989 WL 225428 (D. Vt. 1989).
9.
U.S. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 22-23 (D.R.I. 1989), affd, 910
F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991); Rockwell Int'l. Corp. v.
IU Int1. Corp., 702 F.Supp. 1384, 1391-92 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Idaho v. The Bunker
Hill Co., 635 F.Supp. 665, 671-72 (D. Idaho 1986).
10.
U.S. v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1039 (E.D.N.C. 1989).
11.
See, e.g., U.S. v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
12.
See, e.g., 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d
1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2014 (1991); Dedham Water Co.
v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989); Artesian Water
Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1278-79 (D. Del. 1987), affd, 851
F.2d 643 (3rd Cir. 1988).
13.
A "release" is defined broadly to include "any spilling, leaking, pumping,
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or
disposing into the environment," subject to certain exceptions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(22).
14.
The term "facility" means any building, structure, installation, equipment,
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caused a party to incur response costs; (5) the response costs
are necessary; and (6) the response costs are consistent with
the National Contingency Plan (NCP). 15

3.

Scope of Recoverable Response Costs

The remedies available to private parties under CERCLA
include recovery of response costs and declaratory relief. Response costs include past costs incurred in removal or
remediation of a contaminated site. 16 Although courts are generally reluctant to award future response costs, they may grant
declaratory relief for the recovery of future costs once those
costs have been incurred. 17
Removal and remediation are specifically defined in
CERCLA. Removal activities include investigation of a release,
cleanup or removal of hazardous substances, disposal of removed material, and other actions necessary to minimize damage to the public health, welfare or environment. 18 Removal
activities are generally intended as temporary measures.
Remediation, on the other hand, is intended to provide a more
permanent remedy in lieu of, or in addition to, a removal action. Remediation generally includes action taken to prevent or
minimize the release of hazardous substances so they do not
migrate and endanger the public health or the environment. 19
Recent court opinions have provided additional clarification
of these definitions and identified the following as recoverable
costs under the general parameters of "response costs."

pipe or pipeline, well, pit, impoundment, storage container, vehicle, or any site or
area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, or disposed of, but
does not include any consumer product in consumer use. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
15.
The NCP is promulgated by the EPA order to "establish procedures and
standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and
contaminants . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 9605. The NCP is intended to provide guidance
for cleanup actions and shall address the methods for investigating facilities,
methods for evaluating a release or threatened release, criteria for determining
appropriate removal and remedial measures, roles for government and non-government entities, and means for assuring cost-effectiveness. !d. The provisions of the
NCP dealing with CERCLA were first promulgated in 1982. The NCP was revised
in 1985 and again in 1990. The revised NCP is now codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 300
(1990).
See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).
16.
17.
Williams v. Allied Automotive, Autolite Div., 704 F. Supp. 782, 784 (N.D.
Ohio 1988).
18.
42 u.s.c. § 9601(23).
19.
42 u.s.c. § 9601(24).
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a. Preliminary Investigative Costs. The first step in any
response action is to investigate and assess the extent of contamination. CERCLA specifically includes within the definition
of "removal" "such actions as may be necessary to monitor,
assess, and evaluate the release or threatened release of hazardous substances."2° Courts have generally held that on-site
testing and investigative costs fall within this definition. 21
This may be true even if a party has not yet begun a cleanup.
However, costs incurred before learning of the contamination or
for other purposes such as an environmental audit in connection with a purchase of the property, are not recoverable. 22
b. Cleanup Costs Associated With Removal and
Remediation. Given the intent of CERCLA and the statutory
definition of removal and remediation, courts generally have
little difficulty in concluding that the term response costs
should include a broad range of cleanup activities. 23 This may
include costs associated with cleanup activities such as removal
and disposal of contaminated soil, containers and materials;
storage; confinement; neutralization; construction of fencing,
dikes or ditches; repair or replacement of leaking containers;
and treatment or incineration. 24
c. Public Health and Welfare. Response costs may also include those measures necessary to protect or minimize the risk
or damage to the public health and welfare. CERCLA specifically includes as remedial costs expenses in connection with
"security fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of
alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing
of threatened individuals not otherwise provided for ... [and
other emergency disaster relie£].'>2 5
One issue which has been frequently litigated involves
20.
42 u.s.c. § 9601(23).
See Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568,
21.
1575 (5th Cir. 1988); Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988);
Emhart Industr., Inc. v. Duracell Int1, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 549, 574 (M.D. Tenn.
1987).
22.
See Pennsylvania Urban Dev. Corp. v. Golen, 708 F. Supp. 669, 671 (E.D.
Pa. 1989)
23.
See Piccolini v. Simon's Wrecking, 686 F. Supp. 1063 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
24.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24-25); see, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d
664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563
(E.D. Pa. 1988).
25.
42 u.s.c. § 9601(23).
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recovery of response costs in connection with contamination of
water supplies. Under CERCLA, a party may recover the costs
associated with providing an alternative water supply, 26 but
there is some uncertainty as to whether a party can recover for
the loss of use of existing wells. 27 Similarly, when a private
party is seeking additional water supplies which are not "necessary" remedial costs, recovery may be denied. 28
Other costs relating to public health and welfare include
expenses for medical testing, screening and/or monitoring.
Courts are split on the extent to which these costs are recoverable. In Brewer v. Ravan, 29 the court concluded that medical
expenses incurred in the treatment of personal injuries or diseases caused by a release of hazardous substances are not
recoverable. 30 Nevertheless, the court awarded the costs of
medical testing and screening "to assess the effect of the release or discharge on the public health or to identify potential
public health problems presented by the release." 31 Other
courts have taken a contrary view and concluded that even
costs related to medical screening and/or monitoring are not
"necessary costs of response," and therefore not recoverable. 32

d. Relocation and Evacuation. CERCLA specifically provides
for recovery of costs associated with the temporary evacuation
and housing of threatened individuals. 33 Recovery of costs for
permanent relocation of residents and businesses is also available "where the President determines that, alone or in combination with other matters, such relocation is more cost-effective
than and environmentally preferable to the transportation,
storage, treatment, destruction, or secured disposition offsite of

26.
Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1287 (D. Del.
1987).
See Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (court
27.
concluded that response costs include the loss of use of wells for drinking water);
but see Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (loss of wells
more appropriately characterized as natural resources damages and are not "response costs" for purposes of cost recovery).
28.
See Artesian Water, 659 F. Supp. at 1287.
29.
680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
!d. at 1179.
30.
31.
!d.; see also, Adams v. Republic Steel Corp., 621 F. Supp. 370, 376 (W.D.
Tenn. 1985); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. at 1429-30.
32.
See Lutz, 718 F. Supp. at 418; Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 681 F. Supp. 651,
652-53 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
33.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23); see also, Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles
Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1575 (5th Cir. 1988).
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hazardous substances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect
the public health or welfare ...."34 In the absence of such a
finding, permanent relocation costs are not recoverable. 35

e. Attorney Fees.

Legal costs and attorney fees in a CERCLA
action can be substantial. Courts are divided on whether or not
these fees are recoverable. Some courts have awarded costs and
attorney fees as enforcement activities related to a response action.36 Other courts attempt to distinguish between government and non-government enforcement costs and allowed government recovery of costs and attorney fees, but deny recovery
to private litigants. 37 Finally, at least one court allowed private parties to recover legal costs and fees associated with
investigating and negotiating response activities, but denied
costs and fees of litigation to recover response costs or other
"enforcement expenses."38

f. Costs Not Recoverable. A private party generally cannot
recover damages in an action brought under section 107 of
CERCLA. Damages which are not recoverable include:
(1) Business losses or economic drunages; 39
(2) Diminution in property value; 40
(3) Expenses incurred in connection with personal injuries;41

and

(4) Punitive damages. 42

4. Consistency with the National Contingency Plan (NCP)
A private party can recover the costs of removal or
remediation only to the extent those costs are consistent with

42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
34.
T&E Industries,· Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 707 (D.N.J.
35.
1988).
36.
See General Elec. Co. v. Litton Industr. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d
1415, 1421-1422 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1390 (1991); Pease &
Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal. 1990); Shapiro v.
Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
37.
T&E Industries, 680 F. Supp. at 707-708.
38.
BCW Associates, Ltd. v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 1988 WL 102641 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 29, 1988) (No. Civ. A. 86-5947).
39.
Allied Towing Corp. v. Great Eastern Petroleum Corp., 642 F. Supp. 1339,
1348 (E.D. Va. 1986).
40.
Piccolini v. Simon's Wrecking, 686 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (M.D. Pa. 1988);
Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 681 F. Supp. 651, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
41.
Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn 1988).
42.
Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 151-52 (D.R.I. 1989).
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the NCP. 43 A party seeking recovery bears the burden of proving consistency. Because a removal action is generally taken in
response to an immediate threat, the NCP's procedural requirements are less stringent for removal than remedial actions.
Section 300.415 of the NCP sets forth the factors to be considered in determining the propriety of a removal action. These
regulations include a list of precautions, controls and containment actions that may be appropriate. 44
The NCP requirements for a remedial action are more
stringent than those for removal. The NCP requires a preliminary site assessment, followed by preparation of a Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Study (RifFS) that assesses the site
and appropriate remedies. 45 The private party must then select an appropriate and cost effective remedy and provide an
opportunity for public comment on the alternatives.
It is often difficult to determine whether response costs are
consistent with the NCP. Prior to 1990, courts were divided as
to the appropriate standard to apply in determining consistency.46 In 1990, the EPA amended the NCP to end the confusion. The NCP now provides that a "private party response
action will be considered 'consistent with the NCP' if the action,
when evaluated as a whole, is in substantial compliance with
the applicable requirements ... [of the NCP] and results in a
CERCLA-quality cleanup."47
As a practical matter, a private party should consider obtaining the EPA's approval before incurring any response costs.
Although not a prerequisite to recovery,48 The EPA's approval
may minimize disagreement between parties and enhance the
opportunity for cost recovery. This advantage must be weighed
against the risk that the EPA's approval will delay completion
and increase the costs of the cleanup.

43.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
44.
40 C.F.R. § 300.415 (1991).
45.
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.420 to 300.435 (1991).
46.
Compare Amland Properties Corp. v. Alcoa, 711 F. Supp. 784, 796-97 (D.
N.J. 1989) (strict compliance with NCP not required); Versatile Metals, Inc. v.
Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1579-83 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (site assessment not
consistent with NCP).
47.
See 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i) (emphasis added).
48.
See, e.g., Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th
Cir. 1986).
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5. Apportionment of Liability I Contribution
a. Joint and Several Liability. Liability under CERCLA
is joint and several. 49 However, a court may apportion liability, particularly in a private party action, if defendants can
prove that such a division of costs is appropriate.
In seeking apportionment, the moving party bears the
burden of proving that the harm is divisible. Divisibility of
harm and apportionment may be evaluated by looking to a
variety of equitable factors. Most courts have relied upon the
so-called Gore Factors in evaluating the appropriateness of
apportionment. 5° These factors include: 1) the volume of waste
contributed; 2) the toxicity of waste; 3) the extent to which a
party's contribution is distinguishable from other parties; 4) the
relative degree of care exercised by the parties; and 5) the
degree of cooperation in cleanup. 51
If the harm is not divisible, each party may be joint and
severally liable and responsible for all cleanup costs. 52 Similarly, if the government is involved, courts may hesitate to
apportion liability among private parties, and may instead
require that the parties seek contribution among themselves.53
b. Contribution. Prior to the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), there was some doubt as
to whether CERCLA provided for recovery by contribution.
With the passage of SARA, CERCLA now provides that any
person may seek contribution from another person who is liable
or potentially liable under section 107(a), and a court may
"allocate response costs among liable parties using such equita-

49.
See, e.g., Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913 (N.D.
Okla. 1987).
50.
The Gore Factors refer to criteria named after a sponsor of an amendment
to the original 1980 CERCLA bill. The amendment would have provided considerations upon which to disallow joint and several liability in appropriate cases.
Although the amendment failed, the factors have been considered by courts in
determining the appropriateness of apportionment.
51.
See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Dingwell, 690 F. Supp. 78, 86-87 (D. Me. 1988),
affd sub nom., Travelers lndem. Co. v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629 (1st Cir. 1989);
Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1116-17 (N.D.
Ill. 1988).
52.
Allied Corp., 691 F. Supp. at 1116.
53.
See O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989) cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1115 (1990); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988).
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ble factors as the court determines are appropriate."54 These
"equitable factors" are similar to those discussed above in considering apportionment.
Although the distinctions between an action under section
107 and a contribution claim are often blurred, some important
differences exist. These include:
(1) The only prerequisite to a contribution claim is
that a plaintiff have a claim against another party with whom
it shares CERCLA liability, as opposed to the numerous elements for a prima facie case under section 107 outlined above;
(2) By definition, a contribution action presumes apportionment is necessary and appropriate;
(3) A contribution action may offer a wider scope of
recoverable costs;
(4) A contribution action may offer a wider range of
equitable defenses; and
(5) The applicable statute of limitations may differ
depending upon the type of action brought.

6.

Defenses

Defenses to CERCLA are limited. Under section 107, the
only circumstances under which an otherwise responsible party
can avoid liability is by establishing that the release or threatened release was caused solely by:
(1) An act of God;55
(2) An act of war;
(3) An act or omission of a third party other than an
employee or agent of the defendant, or one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship with
the defendant, and where a) the defendant exercised due care
in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and b) the defendant took prec·autions against such acts or omissions and

54.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
55.
CERCLA defmes "act of God" as an "unanticipated grave natural disaster or
other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character,
the effects of which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of
due care or foresight." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1). Heavy rainfall, hurricanes, or even
earthquakes are probably not acts of God if they are foreseeable and a private
party could have taken measures to guard against the effects. See United States v.
Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (heavy rains not an act of
God because they were foreseeable based upon normal climatic conditions and
because the harm could have been prevented through design and installation of
proper drainage channels).
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the foreseeable results; or
(4) Any combination of the above defenses. 56
Of these defenses, the third-party defense, which also applies to "innocent landowners," is the most frequently used. To
successfully assert the third-party defense, a party must prove
that it had no contractual or other relationship with the third
party causing the release, and that the third party was the sole
cause of the environmental contamination. The defense requires a showing that the discharge could not have been prevented through the exercise of due care. 57 Additionally, to invoke the innocent landowner defense, a party must demonstrate that (1) it purchased the contaminated facility after the
disposal of hazardous substances, and (2) after conducting all
appropriate inquiry, it had no knowledge or reason to know
that hazardous substances had been released or disposed of at
the facility. 58
In addition to the limited statutory defenses to a section
107 action, a variety of common law defenses may be available
in an action for contribution, including estoppel, unclean hands,
laches, due care, and contract or other agreement.
B.

Oil Pollution Act

Releases of petroleum are specifically excluded from coverage by CERCLA under the so-called "petroleum exclusion."59
In an effort to establish a comprehensive liability scheme for oil
spills and in response to the Exxon Valdez incident, Congress
recently enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). 60 The
OPA contains language similar to the hazardous substance
release provisions under CERCLA, but applies specifically to
discharges or threatened discharges of oil into or on navigable
waters, adjoining shoreline, or to the exclusive economic
zone. 61
The scope of waters covered by the OPA is quite broad.
EPA has defined "navigable waters" to include all interstate
waters, and all waters which may be susceptible to or which
could affect interstate or foreign commerce, including lakes,

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

42 U.S.C.
See State
42 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.
33 u.s.c.
33 U.S.C.

§ 9607(b).
v. Time Oil Co., 678 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
§ 9601(35)(A) and (B).
§ 9601(14).
§§ 2701-2761.
§ 2702(a).
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streams, mud flats, wetlands, wet meadows, or natural
ponds. 62 This definition includes normally dry arroyos, 63 as
well as man-made waters. 64 Given this broad definition, the
OPA could have a significant impact on inland areas such as
Utah.
A party who is responsible for a vessel or facility 65 from
which oil is discharged, or which poses a substantial threat of
discharge, into or upon navigable waters may be liable for
removal costs and damages. 66 Liability is strict, joint and several. Removal costs may include the costs of containment and
removal of oil or hazardous substances from water, or such
other actions necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to the
public health or welfare. These costs may also include costs
necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate a substantial
threat of a discharge of oil. 67
Under the OPA, an owner or operator may recover from a
third party that was the sole cause of a discharge, any removal
costs which are consistent with the NCP, as well as damages. 68 This language is substantially similar to CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B), but includes recovery of certain damages
including the loss of real or personal property, loss of subsistence use of natural resources, or loss of profits or earning
capacity. 69
Responsible parties may also seek contribution from other
persons who are liable or potentially liable. 70 Unlike
CERCLA, the OPA does not direct what factors are to be applied in apportioning liability and instead a court must look to
other applicable state and federal law. A contribution action

62.
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).
63.
Quivera Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129-30 (lOth Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
64.
Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1089 (1991).
65.
The OPA defines "responsible party" to include any person owning, operating, or· chartering a vessel; any person owning or operating a facility; the lessee or
permittee of an offshore facility; a licensee of a deep water port; and any person
owning or operating a pipeline. In the case of an abandoned vessel or facility,
"responsible party" includes any person who would have been a responsible party
immediately prior to the abandonment of the vessel or facility. 33 U.S.C. §
2701(32).
66.
33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
67.
33 U.S.C. § 2701(31).
68.
33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)(B) and (d)(1)(A).
See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2).
69.
70.
33 U.S.C. § 2709.
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must be filed within three years of either payment of a claim or
entry of a judgment or judicially approved settlement against
the responsible party. 71
Several defenses similar to those in CERCLA are also
available under the OPA. For instance, a responsible party is
not liable for removal costs or damages if it can demonstrate
that the incident resulted solely from an act of God; an act of
war; or an act or omission of a third party, other than an employee, agent, or party in a contractual relationship with the
responsible party; or some combination of the above. 72

C. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRAf 3
has often been described as "cradle to the grave" regulation of
hazardous substances. The Act applies primarily to active facilities and requires, among other things, that owners and operators of regulated facilities inspect and maintain the facility,
remedy any deteriorations or malfunctions, and eventually
close the facility to prevent or minimize the escape of hazardous materials. RCRA also contains a citizens suit provision
whereby "any person may commence a civil action on his own
behalf ... against any person ... who has contributed or who
is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous
waste which may present an eminent or substantial endangerment to health or the environment ...."74
The citizen suit provision has been widely interpreted to
provide only injunctive relief and no cause of action for private
damages. 75 However, there is support for the proposition that
an owner or operator of a RCRA facility may nonetheless recover the costs of a RCRA mandated corrective action or closure
from other responsible parties by characterizing those costs as
"response costs" under CERCLA. 76 This situation may arise
where a party acquires a RCRA facility which had been con71.
33 u.s.c. § 2717(0(3).
72.
33 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
73.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k).
74.
42 U.S.C. § 6972.
75.
See Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 316 (6th Cir. 1985);
Commerce Holding Co., Inc. v. Buckstone, 749 F. Supp. 441, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
76.
See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Industr., Inc.,
669 F. Supp. 1285, 1289-1291 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.,
600 F. Supp. 1049, 1053-1055 (D. Ariz. 1984) a{fd, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
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taminated by a previous owner. Although subsequent cleanups
may be pursuant to a RCRA order, an owner or operator could
characterize those costs as response costs and potentially recover them under section 107 of CERCLA. 77

D.

State Programs

In addition to the federal statutes discussed above, several
states have enacted laws providing for private recovery of environmental response costs. In Utah, the Legislature passed a
state superfund statute in 1989 known as the Hazardous Substance Mitigation Act (HSMA). 78 The HSMA is considered a
statute of "last resort." It authorizes the Utah Department of
Environmental Quality to undertake cleanup and enforcement
actions at potential hazardous waste sites in Utah only if the
release cannot be cleaned up under any other statute. All remedial investigations and actions under the HSMA must be consistent with the substantive requirements of CERCLA and
follow the procedures of the National Contingency Plan.
Any expenses incurred by the Department of Environmental Quality in the abatement of an emergency release, remedial
investigation, or remedial action may be recovered from responsible parties. 79 A private party which incurs response costs in
excess of its liability may seek to recover those costs from another party who is or may be liable. Unlike CERCLA, the Act
prohibits joint and several liability. Instead, the HSMA provides for contribution and requires the court to apportion costs
based upon the responsible party's contribution to the release.
The court may consider such equitable factors as the quantity,
mobility, persistence, and toxicity of materials contributed, and
the relative behavior of responsible parties contributing to the
release. The burden of proving proportionate contribution is on
each party. If a party does not prove its proportionate contribution, the HSMA directs the court or the Director of the Department to apportion liability based upon available evidence and
the standards set forth above. 80

77.
See Mardan, 600 F. Supp. at 1049.
78.
See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-6-301 to 19-6-325 (1991).
79.
See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-6-310(1), 316(1), 318(1) (1991).
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-6-310(2); § 19-6-316(2);
80.
§ 19-6-318(2) (1991).
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LAW THEORIES OF RECOVERY

In addition to the above statutory sources for cost recovery,
there are several common law theories which may assist parties in recovering the costs of environmental cleanups. These
actions may be pursued either in addition to CERCLA or other
statutory claims, or independently if the elements of the applicable statute cannot be met.

A. Nuisance
Perhaps the most frequently used common law cause of
action for relief from environmental harm is that of nuisance.
Generally, an action in nuisance can provide both equitable
relief and damages which result from the unlawful interference
with the use and enjoyment of one's property. The elements of
nuisance are:
(1) Another person's conduct is the legal cause of an
invasion of one's interest in the private use and enjoyment of
land; and
(2) The invasion is either intentional and unreasonable; or unintentional but otherwise actionable under the rules
controlling liability for negligent conduct, reckless conduct, o:r
abnormally dangerous conditions or activities. 81
In Utah, courts are generally more concerned with the
nature and relative importance of the interests interfered with,
than with the unreasonableness of the conduct leading to the
invasion. The preeminent Utah case examining the application
of nuisance in the environmental context is Branch v. Western
Petroleum. 82 In Branch, a petroleum company was found liable for nuisance and strict liability for oil waste products which
had been placed in a waste pit and subsequently seeped into
the groundwater ·of an adjacent landowner. In reaching this
conclusion the court looked to the type and extent of the invasion upon plaintiffs property interest and found it of no consequence that defendant was engaged in a wholly legitimate
business.
The Branch court also recognized the doctrine of nuisance
per se. 83 Under this theory, if a defendant's conduct creates a

81.
82.
83.

RESI'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979).
657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982).
ld. at 276.
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nuisance and also violates a statutory prohibition, such conduct
may constitute a nuisance per se without regard to the conduct
or interests involved. In analyzing nuisance per se the reasonableness of defendant's conduct and the balancing of relative
interests is immaterial because the Legislature has presumably
intended to strike any such balancing in favor of the innocent
party.
B.

Trespass

A claim for trespass requires a plaintiff to demonstrate
that a defendant or something in defendant's control has recklessly or negligently, or as a result of an abnormally dangerous
activity, entered the land belonging to another and caused
harm to the land or the possessor. 84 Although closely related,
trespass is distinguishable from nuisance in that trespass requires a physical invasion, while a nuisance generally interfers
with a person's use and enjoyment of the land. In the context of
pollution cases, these causes of action often overlap and a court
may combine a trespass claim with a claim for nuisance.

C. Negligence
To recover on a claim of negligence, a potential plaintiff
must show that:
(1) The defendant had a legal duty or obligation to the
plaintiff which required the defendant to conform to a standard
of conduct that protects the plaintiff from unreasonable risks;
(2) That the defendant failed to conform to that standard;
(3) That the harm suffered was proximately caused by
the defendant's failure to conform to the standard; and
(4) That the plaintiffs person or property was actually
injured or damaged. 85
The doctrine of negligence is not commonly used in environmental waste litigation because of the difficulties in proving
defendant's duty to the plaintiff and causation of plaintiffs
harm.

84.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 165 (1965).
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
85.
30 at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
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Strict Liability

Strict liability is often characterized as liability regardless
of fault. Under Utah law, persons who engage in abnormally
dangerous activities may be strictly liable for damages proximately caused by that activity, independent of the presence or
absence of any negligent conduct. The critical issue is determining whether the conduct leading to the environmental harm
constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity. Courts may look
not only to the type of activity involved, but also its proximity
to adjacent property owners, risks associated with the activity,
and public policy. In Branch, the Utah Supreme Court held the
oil company strictly liable for polluting its neighbor's water
wells because the company's disposal of formation water into
the waste pit "constituted an abnormally dangerous and inappropriate use of the land in light of its proximity to the
[neighbor's] property and was unduly dangerous to [their] use
of their well water."86 The court also indicated that it may be
more inclined to impose strict liability upon industrial polluters
because industry "can and should assume the costs of pollution
as a cost of doing business rather than charge the loss to a
wholly innocent party."87
IV.

INSURANCE

An additional method of recovering or minimizing the costs
of environmental liabilities is through insurance. Increasingly,
companies involved in environmental cleanups are turning to
present and former insurers to recover costs incurred in connection with such cleanups. However, because of the staggering
costs associated with cleanups, adequate environmental coverage is often costly and difficult to obtain.
The opportunity to recover environmental response costs
depends largely upon the extent of coverage provided in aliability insurance policy. If the policy either expressly excludes or
includes environmental liability, then coverage issues should
not arise. More commonly, coverage issues arise in determining
whether a traditional Comprehensive General Liability (CGL)
policy includes environmental harms. Since 1970, CGL policies
have typically included a "pollution exclusion" that denies cov-

86.
87.

Branch, 657 P.2d at 274.

!d. at 275.
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erage for pollution claims unless the pollution was "sudden and
accidental." Thus, immediate and unintentional releases typically will be covered under a CGL policy, but gradual or longterm releases may not.
Where ambiguities in an insurance policy exist, the general
rule of construction is in favor of the insured. If a claim is covered, courts typically allow recovery of response costs which
can be characterized as damages to property. 88 However,
where response costs are considered a mere economic loss or
equitable "damages," courts are more likely to deny recovery. 89
V.

CONCLUSION

In light of the potentially staggering costs associated with
environmental response, it has become increasingly important
for persons facing these costs to identify other responsible parties to share the expense. Fortunately, several federal and state
statutes, as well as common law theories, are available to assist parties in recovering environmental response costs from
others who share the responsibility. By using these
mechanisms, parties who incur costs can attempt to inject some
level of fairness into the system, and force those parties which
bear the bulk of the responsibility for environmental contamination to also bear the bulk of the cost.

88.
See Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D.
Cal. 1988).
89.
See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1988);
Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 842 F.2d 977
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988).

